Iqra Bawany*
Before the early 2000s,
arbitration in tax treaties was relatively uncommon. However, this trend was
reversed in 2008 when the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) introduced a dispute resolution clause in the OECD Model Convention for
Tax Treaties. This move was followed by the UN’s inclusion of an arbitration
clause, in 2011, in the UN Model Convention for Tax Treaties. It must be noted
from the outset that the OECD model is typically targeted towards bilateral tax
treaties signed between developed OECD member countries. On the other hand, the
UN Model targets taxation treaties between developed and developing countries
and was designed to accommodate the needs of developing countries which are
typically disadvantaged by tax treaty negotiation.[1]
Nonetheless, the OECD Model is far more popular with both developed and
developing countries and has been expanded in scope to accommodate the
popularity of the convention as demonstrated by the OECD’s introduction of a
more inclusive framework for its recent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)
project.
Since the rapid
expansion of the OECD Model Convention to over 135 countries, tax treaty
disputes have increased significantly as a result of various measures that have
been introduced to address the issues of tax avoidance and treaty abuse.[2]
Moreover, as international competition for tax revenues intensifies between
states, so do issues of double taxation. This combined with the digitisation of
the global economy, which has brought the question of the taxation of
multinational enterprises (MNEs) to the fore, has made tax treaty disputes more
important than ever. As MNEs engage in
more thorough evaluations of jurisdictions for their activity and have
unparalleled flexibility to move jurisdictions at their convenience, tax
considerations have become increasingly important in driving business
decisions. Therefore, there was a desperate need to create a ‘dependable,
independent and treaty-based mandatory dispute resolution [system] as a cornerstone
of BEPS’ which was the ‘only realistic antidote to predictable tensions.’[3] This
necessitated the introduced of an arbitration clause in the respective taxation
conventions, especially given that, arbitration has natural advantages as an
alternative dispute resolution mechanism for international tax treaties, given
its ‘quasi-judicial method’[4].
However, the OECD and UN’s introduction of arbitration clauses has been less
than satisfactory and is not nearly robust or effective enough to deal with the
actual issues arising out of tax treaty disputes.
Therefore, this essay is
split into three sections. The first is a brief overview of the development of
methods of dispute resolution such as the mutual agreement procedure (MAP) to
establish why it was necessary to introduce arbitration clauses into the OECD
and UN Model Conventions. The second section focuses on the OECD and UN Model
Conventions arbitration clauses. The aim of this section is to illuminate why
arbitration is still underutilised in the case of tax treaty disputes and the
issues that have arisen from these arbitration clauses. Lastly, this essay will
look towards the future and how arbitration can be reconceptualized in the
context of tax treaty disputes to increase its utilisation. It must be noted
though that since the introduction of arbitration in OECD and UN Models is so
recent, information about the actual experience of countries with arbitration
is ‘scarce and at best anecdotal’. [5]
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TAX DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Between the First and
Second World Wars, there was a trickle of bilateral double taxation agreements
under the guise of the League of Nations 1924 Model Double Taxation Agreement.
While at the time it was not felt that there was a need to include a dispute
resolution mechanism, the Agreement did include a technical committee to decide
on double taxation disputes. [6]
In 1943, Mexico Draft
Convention was established and followed by the 1946 London Draft Convention,
which both led to an explosion of bilateral double taxation agreements, with
over 70 treaties being signed between 1946 and 1956.[7] As a
result, rules for a mutual agreement procedure (MAP) started to emerge within
following draft conventions in order to tackle the international problems
arising from double taxation treaties such as difficulties in the
interpretation of the provisions of a convention or cases of double taxation
not covered by the guiding principles of the chosen convention.[8] In
essence, MAP is a mutual negotiation-based dispute resolution mechanism between
the two treaty partners of a Double Tax Agreement (DTA).[9] While the
form of MAP can vary, it typically involves meetings between the relevant,
competent tax authorities to consult to resolve disputes regarding the
application of the DTA and these authorities may appoint a commission of
representatives to oversee a case.
Rules for MAPs started
to become more and more common in order to authorise the competent authorities
to enter dispute resolution negotiations with regards to individual cases that
were not caught by the convention. The
OECD’s Draft Convention on Income and on Capital formalised these rules in 1963
therefore making the MAP the foremost mechanism for resolving tax treaty
disputes. Subsequently, the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs set about
revising its dispute resolution mechanisms from 1971 onwards. Finally, in 1977,
the OECD adopted its Model Convention for Tax Treaties which codified the MAP
in Article 25 of the convention. This convention is the basis for over 3000 tax
treaties and serves as the framework for the negotiation of bilateral tax
treaties.[10] The
importance of the MAP ‘stems from the fact that it provides taxpayers with an
alternative to tax litigation, which can be cumbersome and uncertain.’[11]
Therefore the MAP is itself an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.
The problems with the
MAP are multifaceted. The procedure itself is significantly limited as it only
‘contemplated the appointment of commissions to serve as consultative bodies
for each particular dispute’ and did not provide a binding legal authority or
instrument to resolve them.[12]
Moreover, the Convention lacked a clear procedure or mechanism for dispute resolution,
and nor did it provide clarity on how taxpayers were able to utilise the
procedure to bring forward disputes. Even after its revision in the 1977 OECD
Model Convention, MAP was not a strong solution for the dispute resolution
problems in international tax disputes. The revised procedure built off the
original MAP mechanism but only entertained the possibility of a joint
commission for the purposes of oral negotiations via representatives. The OECD does
not specify how a competent authority could or should be formed but only
protects taxpayers’ rights to make their case in front of such an authority
should it emerge.[13]
Furthermore, more and
more tax treaties have been concluded since the turn of the century
particularly by developing countries who are keen to attract business from
MNEs. As more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows into emerging economies,
there have been increased numbers of disputes where DTAs are applicable.
However, the tax administrations of developing countries often lack the
experience and resources needed to deal with the negotiation-based MAP or have
been denied access to both MAP and arbitration.[14] The
underutilisation and improper functioning of the MAP mechanism has directly necessitated
the broadening of the arbitration options available under the OECD and UN model
Tax Conventions. The known weakness of the MAP, including the inability of the
competent authorities to effectively conclude agreements, have made the
expansion of arbitration clauses in the conventions much more appealing.
However, the form and content of these clauses have failed to deliver a more
robust dispute resolution mechanism in tax treaties.
III. CURRENT MECHANISMS FOR TAX TREATY DISPUTE RESOLUTION
a. ARTICLE 25 OF THE OECD MODEL CONVENTION ON TAX TREATIES
The provisions for
dispute resolution in the OECD lie in article 25 of the OECD Model Convention
on Taxation Treaties. Under subclause 1 of the OECD Model, taxpayers can
initiate proceedings with the competent authority in their residence state, if
they believe that taxation is not or will not be in accordance with the tax
treaty. This constitutes the first stage of the MAP. The second stage of the
procedures takes place between said competent authority in the residence state
and the contracting authority in another state to negotiate, but not
necessarily reach an agreement on the issue. Sub clauses 2 and 3 lay out the
specifics of the MAP, including taxpayers’ rights and time limits for action (3
years from the notification of action). Article 25(5) which was adopted in 2008
introduced compulsory ad-hoc
arbitration as an option for the taxpayer. The clause provides that a taxpayer
can request that any issues which remain unresolved by the MAP can be resolved
through arbitration if the competent authorities are unable to resolve them
within 2 years.[15]
There is no opportunity for arbitration on issues where a decision has already
been rendered by the court or administrative tribunal of either State.[16] The
details and form of the arbitration process are left to the discretion of the
competent authorities. Unless the person directly affected by the case does not
agree to the mutual agreement that implements the arbitration decision, the
arbitration decision is binding.
b. ARTICLE 25, ALTERNATIVE B OF THE UN MODEL ON TAX TREATIES
The UN Model has two
main provisions dealing with MAP, Article 25 A and B, only one of which
provides for arbitration. This article as a whole mostly draws on the text of
the OECD model. For example, Article 25, paragraphs 1 to 3 of the UN Convention
are almost identical as the OECD convention. As per Article 25 B sub clause (5),
unresolved issues in a MAP case that have not been resolved within 3 years
(compared to 2 years under the OECD) can be submitted for arbitration but only by one of the competent authorities.[17]
This is the main point of divergence between the two models, in that under the
UN convention, the taxpayer is not entitled to request that the issue be pushed
through to arbitration but is only entitled to be notified of such a request by
the competent authority.
Moreover, the decision
of the arbitration is not necessarily binding under the UN convention as the
competent authorities have 6 months after the arbitration decision to reach a
different resolution.[18]
From these provisions it is clear that the UN Model Convention is driven
primarily by the competent authority and not the taxpayer, which is rather
unusual as the person who brings the dispute is not given a mandate over how
the issue is ultimately resolved. Lastly, under the UN Model Convention,
arbitration is not truly compulsory but an alternative option to article 25 A
which reinforces the MAP and aims to resolve disputes through negotiation.
Subsequently there is no right to arbitration and the relevant competent
authorities ‘can agree to prevent an unresolved issue from proceeding to
arbitration.’[19] The
explanatory text of the Convention offers up a reasoning behind this, stating
that ‘under voluntary arbitration countries preserve great flexibility as to
the issues that will be subjected to arbitration and may restrict the potential
number of cases that could proceed to arbitration and reduce the potential
costs of arbitration.”[20]
c. BENEFITS OF ARBITRATION COMPARED TO MAP
There are clear
advantages to having robust arbitration clauses in DTAs that need not be
understated. For example, the mere inclusion of an arbitration clause in a tax
treaty might affect relationships between contracting parties in a positive
way.[21]
Moreover, arbitration clauses provide an instrument through which unresolved
disputes under MAP can come to a close. Without the inclusion of such a
provision, tax treaty disputes often have no consequences for competent
authorities and therefore, no incentive to resolve cases. If these authorities
are subject to mandatory arbitration, they are more incentivised to find a
domestic resolution to the solution for fear of surrendering their tax
sovereignty to a third party.[22]
Significantly though, arbitration may relieve political pressure for competent
authorities who may be expected to arrive at conclusions that are beneficial to
their government, regardless of technical merits of the case.[23]
Moreover, the chance of
enforcing an arbitral award is higher than obtaining enforcement based on the
outcome of MAP negotiations between two tax authorities.[24] For
example, under the New York Convention, courts are required to enforce an
arbitral award, which they cannot do for negotiation based agreements.[25]
Indeed, this was the primary driving force behind the inclusion of a compulsory
arbitration clause in the OECD Model in the first instance, as there was a
growing concern that MAP was not providing consistent results in a growing
number of complex disputes fuelled by cross border trade. [26]
d. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE ARBITRATION CLAUSES
From the outset, one of
the primary reasons that the current arbitration mechanisms have fallen short
is that these conventions do not recognise arbitration as its own sufficient
mechanism for alternative dispute resolution. The model conventions continue to
tack arbitration on to the MAP and see it as ‘an extension of the MAP process’
rather than a standalone, independent mechanism that could effectively resolve
cross border tax disputes.[27]
Arbitration is not available independently of the MAP and tends to be a last
resort where the competent authorities of the parties to a DTA have not been
able to reach an agreement on the issues within a case that has gone through
the MAP already. Consequently, arbitration is a part of MAP and subject to any
and all limitations in the procedure itself. For example, the binding nature of
the arbitral award is conditional upon the acceptance of the MAP by the
taxpayer. Therefore, a taxpayer bringing forward a tax dispute through the MAP
in the OECD convention could reject the result of a MAP based arbitration
agreement.[28]
Similarly, in the UN Model Convention, far too much emphasis is placed on the
competent authority instead of letting the taxpayer drive the dispute forward. Therefore,
the wishes of the competent authorities can easily override those of a taxpayer
and subsequently authorities can also overrule an arbitration decision that
they disagree with.
To some extent, this
position in the UN Model Convention can be justified since developing countries
predominantly use the UN Convention. Due
to the lack of expertise of tax authorities in developing countries,
arbitration would be unfair when the dispute occurs with a country that has
significantly more expertise.[29]
Arbitrators cannot be expected to make up for this lack of expertise and nor
can they be burdened with the safeguarding of a state's tax policy.[30]
There also concerns as to the qualifications, neutrality and independence of
potential arbitrators, especially since neither arbitration clauses sets out a
standard for qualifications nor the criteria for finding an arbitrator.
Moreover, there are also concerns, from non-OECD countries in particular, about
the high costs of arbitration, especially to the tax authority itself, which
can be just as high as traditional dispute resolution (i.e., domestic
litigation). Furthermore, there are ex
ante costs of negotiations and mediations in MAP before the pursuit of ad hoc arbitration which `make it cost-prohibitive for
developing countries to pursue arbitration at the final stage, having already
spent money on MAP. Consequently, tax authorities from weaker economies ‘stand
to lose their advantages when entering into ad
hoc arbitration’ in international tax matters.[31]
Furthermore, there is
strong opposition in general towards arbitration clauses, but particularly by
developing countries. This is evidenced by the fact that out of nearly 3500
DTAs signed between 2008 and 2014, only 178 of them included some form of an
arbitration clause. Of these 178, 20 of these were not arbitration clauses per
se but could be considered ‘semi-arbitration’ clauses.[32] Such
clauses have little practical relevance but can be useful where the two states
have opposingly views on arbitration and can be encouraged to engage in the
dispute resolution through the inclusion of a ‘most-favoured-nation’ clause.[33]
Of the remaining 158 that did include a
compulsory arbitration clause, 82 were between an OECD Member and a non-OECD
member. Only 13 were concluded between two non-OECD member countries.[34] By way of comparison, there were the 63 DTAs
signed between two OECD member states that followed the OECD arbitration clause
model but only nine that did not. [35] The
figures therefore paint a very grim picture about the acceptance of arbitration
among developing nations. Moreover, despite the high number of DTAs with
arbitration clauses between OECD member states, the reality is that a little
general consensus on arbitration and instead limited number of states have
widely accepted and included such clauses in their DTAs. These states include
the Netherlands, with 38 such agreements, Canada with 20, Switzerland with 17
and Italy and the UK with 16 each.[36]
IV. RECONCEPTUALISING ARBITRATION CLAUSES AS A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE IN TAX TREATY
DISPUTES
The increased mobility
of economic activity, especially in the current digital age, has led to MNEs
evaluating their tax liabilities more thoroughly when determining potential
investment locations. Therefore, improving the effectiveness of tax treaty
arbitration is an essential cornerstone for economic growth. The introduction
of a mandatory ad hoc arbitration
clause in the OECD model and an optional clause in the UN convention was the
first step in making alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to MAP available
and expanding avenues to justice for taxpayers. The BEPS 1.0 plan included an
action plan to making dispute resolution mechanism more effective (Action 14)
highlighting the importance of making tax treaties as effective as possible at
the point of implementation in the increasingly competitive global economy.[37]
However, these measures need to be followed up by a more robust expansion of
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, especially since the OECD has
doubled down on its BEPS framework in 2020 with the introduction of its second
action plan and expanded to include developing countries in the inclusive
framework.[38] The
OECD’s BEPS 2.0 plan also includes a multilateral instrument that would amend
all existing DTAs in line with the OECD’s recommendations to tackle tax
avoidance and profit shifting, without having to renegotiate individual
treaties. The corollary of this, however, is that since the multilateral
instrument will affect more than 1,600 tax treaties, there will inevitably be a
number of tax treaty disputes that arise.[39]
In order to effectively and efficiently deal with this fallout, the conventions
must make arbitration a viable alternative to MAP instead of a last resort. In
doing so parties to DTAs and taxpayers will both benefit from the full range of
the advantages of arbitration rather than treating it as ‘a perfunctory
instrument used only to force the competent authorities to find a solution for
disputes.’[40]
This would mean
systematically tackling developing countries’ concerns about the arbitration
process, including introducing a minimum standard and set of best practices for
arbitrators so that concerns about neutrality and impartiality can be overcome.
Another solution would be to replace ad hoc arbitration with institutional
arbitration where parties can choose their set of arbitration rules in advance.
Since institutional arbitration permits the parties to use rules that are
already in place, this will bring an element of certainty and predictability to
the proceedings in terms of outcome as well as costs and resources. This will
also allow arbitrators, who are already specialists in the rules and procedures
of that arbitral institution, to function more effectively while alleviating
the burden of finding an arbitrator in the first place.[41]
Institutional arbitration could then easily take centre stage, especially for
taxpayers, without forcing parties to navigate through the MAP first. Moreover,
institutional arbitration would bring a level of uniformity in tax treaty
interpretation to arbitration proceedings that does not currently exist under
the OECD and UN conventions.[42]
Against the backdrop of the current ad hoc arbitration procedure, the
logistical and enforceability advantages of institutional arbitration are
substantial. More radically even, perhaps it is possible for a specific set of
rules to be developed by the OECD/UN to deal with issues arising out of tax
arbitration and tax treaty interpretation (much like UNCITRAL).[43]
Lastly, making arbitration a standalone dispute resolution option, and thereby
more common, will allay states’ fears about engaging in arbitration and ‘disarm
those states who might misleadingly resort to their tax sovereignty concerns’
as a way of avoiding a fair dispute resolution process.[44]
In conclusion, the
increasingly interconnected and globalised economy has resulted in the immense
proliferation of tax treaty disputes. As MNEs engage in more thorough
evaluations of jurisdictions for their economic activity, tax considerations
have become increasingly important in driving such decisions. As a result,
there is a desperate need to reconceptualise alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms in tax treaties to create an efficient, cost effective and timely
method for resolving tax disputes. However, the previous mutual agreement
procedure in both the OECD and UN Model Convention on Tax treaties, the two
most popular conventions underlying DTAs in the last half century, has been
below par. The MAP has several known weaknesses that make it a poor mechanism
for resolving tax disputes. This includes the lack of clearly outlined procedures
for dispute resolution beyond protecting the right to oral representations
between competent authorities and taxpayers. Moreover, MAP has also resulted in
the inability of the competent authorities to effectively conclude agreements
without any consequences.
The failure of the MAP
has driven the inclusion of arbitration clauses in the DTAs but with little
success. The form and content of these arbitration clauses have failed to
deliver a more robust dispute resolution system in tax treaties. This is driven
partly by the treatment of arbitration as a last resort mechanism when MAP has
failed, instead of a stand-alone dispute resolution method. The ad hoc nature of the clauses has also
buoyed fears about the choice, neutrality and impartiality of arbitrators as
well as costs. In particular for developing countries that lack the expertise
for MAP, pursuing arbitration is even less likely. While tax sovereignty also
plays a role in states unwillingness to engage in arbitration, this is less
likely to be the case when arbitration is a full standalone option. With
regards to the UN Convention in particular, arbitration is not even a backup
but an optional alternative and so, the competent authority is able to dominate
the proceedings. Therefore, the wishes of the competent authorities can easily
override those of a taxpayer, making arbitration an unattractive option for
taxpayers in certain jurisdictions.
This essay advocates for
more robust and formal arbitration procedures that would systematically tackle
states’ fears about arbitration and make it more attractive as a method for
resolving tax treaty disputes. These recommendations include the introduction
of a minimum standard and set of best practices for arbitrators so that
concerns about neutrality and impartiality can be overcome easily. A vast
majority of these concerns can also be dealt with by simply replacing ad hoc
arbitration with institutional arbitration thereby reducing the uncertainty and
unpredictability of proceedings, while simultaneously bringing down costs. The
logistical and enforceability advantages of institutional arbitration are
substantial in this way. A more radical solution would be the development of a
specific set of rules for tax treaty disputes by either the OECD or UN, however
this is unlikely to be enacted any time soon. While we are unlikely to see
changes to either model conventions in the near future, there is potential to
massively expand the scope of arbitration in tax treaty in a way that is
beneficial to everyone.
* University of Cambridge. E-mail: Ib434@cantab.ac.uk
BIBLIOGRAPHY
United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between developed and developing countries (originally adopted in 1988, updated in 2017), accessed 22nd January 2021, https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/MDT_2017.pdf
OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 2017, OECD Publishing, Paris. Accessed 22nd January 2021 https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-condensed-version-2017_mtc_cond-2017-en#page46
OECD (2015), Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective, Action 14 - 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/making-dispute-resolution-mechanisms-more-effective-action-14-2015-final-report-9789264241633-en.htm
Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards [New York Convention] (adopted 7th June
1959)
Secondary Sources
Chetcuti, Jean-Phillippe ‘Tax Dispute Resolution: Arbitration in International Tax Dispute Resolution.’ (2001), accessed 22nd January 2021 http://www.inter-lawyer.com/lex-e-scripta/articles/tax-arbitration.htm#_ftn2
Dagan, Tsilly International Tax Policy: Between Competition and Cooperation (Cambridge University Press 2017)
Implementation of the Multilateral Convention” Deloitte, Accessed 17th April 2021 https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/tax/articles/implementation-of-the-multilateral-convention.html
Lang, Michael, and Jeffrey Owens. 2015. International Arbitration in Tax Matters. WU Institute for Austrian and International Tax Law European and International Tax Law and Policy. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: IBFD.
Pitt, H.M. Arbitration under the OECD Model Convention: Follow-up under Double Tax Conventions: An Evaluation, Intertax 2014
Salehifar, Alireza 'Rethinking the Role of Arbitration in International Tax Treaties', (2020), 37, Journal of International Arbitration, Issue 1, pp. 87-130, https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/Journal+of+International+Arbitration/37.1/JOIA2020004 accessed 22 January 2021.
[1] Tsilly Dagan, International Tax
Policy: Between Competition and Cooperation (Cambridge University Press
2017), 148
[2] Jean- Pierre Lieb, “Introduction: Taking the
Debate Forward” in Michael Lang & Jeffery Owens (eds) International Arbitration in Tax Matters (IBFD 2015)
[3] Ibid, s1.1.
[4] Jasmin
Kollmann and Laura Turcan, “Overview of the Existing Mechanisms to Resolve
Disputes and Their Challenges” in Michael Lang & Jeffery Owens (eds) International Arbitration in Tax Matters
(IBFD 2015)
[5] Brian Arnold, ‘The Scope of Arbitration under
Tax Treaties’ in Michael Lang & Jeffery Owens (eds) International Arbitration in Tax Matters (IBFD 2015)
[6]
Jean-Phillippe Chetcuti, ‘Tax Dispute Resolution: Arbitration in
International Tax Dispute Resolution.’ (2001), accessed 22nd January 2021 http://www.inter-lawyer.com/lex-e-scripta/articles/tax-arbitration.htm#_ftn2
[7] Dagan (n 1), 146
[8] Ibid.
[9]Alireza Salehifar,
'Rethinking the Role of Arbitration in International Tax Treaties', (2020), 37,
Journal of International Arbitration, Issue 1, p87 https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/Journal+of+International+Arbitration/37.1/JOIA2020004 accessed 22 January 2021.
[11] Kollmann and Turcan (n 4)
[12] Chetcuti (n 6)
[13] Ibid.
[14] Kollmann and Turcan (n 4)
[15] OECD, Model
Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 2017, OECD
Publishing, Article 25(5) Paris .https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-condensed-version-2017_mtc_cond-2017-en#page46
[16] Ibid.
[17] United Nations Model Double Taxation
Convention between developed and developing countries (originally adopted in
1988, updated in 2017), accessed 22nd January 2021 https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/MDT_2017.pdf
[18] Arnold (n 5), p113
[19] Ibid, 114.
[20] UN Model Commentary (n 16) art. 25, para 14
[21] Kollmann and Turcan (n 4)
[22] Ibid.
[23] A Salehifar (n 9), p 91
[24] Ibid, 90
[25] New York Convention, Art. III (7th June 1959)
[26] H.M. Pitt, Arbitration under the OECD Model Convention: Follow-up under Double Tax
Conventions: An Evaluation, Intertax 2014, p.466
[27] A Salehifar (n 9), p88
[28] Kollmann and Turcan (n 4), 112
[29] UN Model Commentary 2011 (n 16), art 25, para
4
[30] Ibid.
[31] A Salehifar (n 9), p 93
[32] Kollmann and Turcan (n 4), 47
[33] Ibid
[34] Pitt (n 25), p 448
[35] Kollmann and Turcan (n 4), 48
[36] Kollmann and Turcan (n
4), 47
[37] OECD (2015), Making Dispute
Resolution Mechanisms More Effective, Action 14 - 2015 Final Report,
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing,
Paris, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/making-dispute-resolution-mechanisms-more-effective-action-14-2015-final-report-9789264241633-en.htm
[38] See also OECD Statement by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-Pillar
Approach to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the
Economy, http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/statement-by-the-oecd-g20-inclusive-framework-on-beps.htm
[39] “Implementation
of the Multilateral Convention” Deloitte, Accessed 17th April 2021 https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/tax/articles/implementation-of-the-multilateral-convention.html
[40] A Salehifar (n 9), 94
[41] Ibid, 98
[42] Ibid, 99
[43] Ibid, 100
[44] Ibid, 129
0 Comentarios